World History College Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

World History College - Essay Example The condition of women within a particular society was dramatically impacted by the amount of socialization the central culture had developed. For example, India had a heavy caste system wherein women were viewed as weak, frivolous, unimportant, etc. (AUTHOR # 1 132). The fact that the social system perceived women in such a negative light, and was then too inflexible to accommodate change, resulted in women remaining in oppressive or inferior positions with no recourse. In fact, it was the very development of these types of systems that relegated women to a lower class structure. As AUTHOR # 2 states, "women enjoyed broader occupational options and a stronger voice within the family and in society as a whole before the emergence of centralized politics and highly stratified social systems (AUTHOR # 2 268). Not unpredictably, the more money a woman's family possessed, the better daily life she lived. A poor woman would be expected to work in the field or perform other menial tasks while a rich woman would be less likely to experience hardship.

The media coverage Essay Example for Free

The media coverage Essay Write a team report explaining the nature of the crisis or problem. Discuss the media coverage, cite how the crisis or problem was handled by the person on the organization staff and critique the way the situation was handled by the media and the organization. Segregation between different ethic groups is common around the world. The tendency of mixing around with ones own race, especially in ones private space, is observable not only in Singapore but also in many other countries. Here in this report, we will look into the issue of racial discrimination in Singapore. What causes the individuals here to feel alienated or under-represented? Is there any possibility of us rising above the differences and appreciate them for what they are? Will the differences become transparent? How the government ensures that the minorities here are given equality with the rest? How did the government handle such situations? Have the government put in enough effort to handle these racial tensions? Introduction: Singapore, a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society where all individual are given free reign to practice the religion of their choice. Four major racial groups will be Chinese, Malays, Indians and Eurasians. Therefore, to prevent any racial discrimination between the four groups, the government has made conscious effort in ensuring that the different ethnic groups in Singapore are equally represented. One big hurdle will be to achieve racial harmony between ethnic groups, encourage individuals to foster respect, understanding and acceptance of cultures within ones society. Some minorities has raise the issue of feeling alienated by the society and that the government has not done enough to reduce such issue. Still, through the recent survey, the majority of Singaporeans think of themselves more as citizens of Singapore than the race they are. This applies equally to all the three larger racial groups: Chinese, Malays and Indians. The strong national identity has still remained important within us and majority support Singapore to have a multi-racial society which allows for ethnicity and representation of ethnic identity. Social Integration cannot be achieved by holding a campaign or relying on the government implementation. It has to come from individual effort. Even though that there is a slight issue within these ethnic groups, we are still united and strong and able to fight against any destruction to protect our own nation. The recent SARs crisis, Fabric of Nation and National Day has definitely showed the strong bond between these four ethnic groups.

Calorimeter Process

Calorimeter Process 1. Introduction The report as a study for nozzle operated under pressure difference from 0.1 to 10 bars. Under this specification the report discuss the next point. The factor affecting on the nozzle efficiency Application in natural gas Effect of nozzle efficiency on the quality of combustion and how the quality of combustion could be enhanced 1.1. Definition The nozzle defined as: device setting in the flow path to achieve change in pressure, temperature and the velocity also it can defined as an mechanical device designed to achieve controlling process on the direction or characteristic of the fuel flow as it exits or entry it can take the shape of an closed chamber or pipe via an orifice . Reference: http//www.Engineeringtoolbox.com 1- Pressure We con notice that when the fluids flow through the nozzle as the pressure increased the discharge rate also increased and all other factor remains constant. The relationship between the pressure and discharge from a nozzle exit is A fundamental equation. The theoretical discharge from any nozzle Given by the next relation. Flow rate = CA (2gh) 5 C Means the dimensionless coefficient for the particular nozzle in question. A Means the area of the nozzle orifice. h- Means the pressure head applied to the nozzle. G Means the acceleration of gravity. As the pressure acts in the nozzle exit it directly affect to the stream of fuel .let us compare in the below figure between the gas stream with different pressure. 1- Differential pressure flow meters In case of the differential pressure drop this device used to calculate the flow by measuring the pressure drop over an obstruction inserted in the flow. The main idea of the differential pressure flow meter is based on the Bernoulli equation. These achieved by measuring pressure drop signal as function of square flow speed. p1 + 1/2 ? v12 = p2 + 1/2 ? v22 The most common types of differential pressure flow meters are a- Orifice plate With the using of the orifice plate, the fluid flow is measured through the difference in pressure from the upstream side to the downstream side. As showing in figure 1 : this process used in case when dont needs for high accuracy. b- Venturi tube Its best used in our case because this apparatus used in case of low pressure drop between the inlet and the outlet of nozzle. In the venturi tube application the flow rate is measured by reducing the cross section flow area in the path of the fluid flow After the constricted area, the fluid passes through the pressure recovery section. When up to 80 % of the differential pressure generated at the constricted area, is recovered with proper instrument and flow calibrating. The venture tube flow can be less to about ten percentage of its full scale range with proper accuracy. c- Flow nozzle The flow nozzle are often used as measuring elements for gas flow application When the gas accelerated through the nozzle, the velocity increase and the pressure so the gas density decreased and the maximum velocity done in the throat section. Recovery of pressure drop in orifices , nozzles and venture meters After the pressure difference has been generated in the differential flow meter. The fluid passing during the pressure recovery section. By means where the differential pressure generated at the constricted area is partly recovered 2- Variable area flow meter The rotameter composed of an vertically glass tube with large end in the top section of the main body of the rotameter and metering float which it free move . when the fluid flow causes the float raise in the tube and apply the relation of Ά P = h * g * P Where Ά P =pressure difference between inlet and outlet H = float recording P = fluid density 3- Velocity flowmeters In this process the flow calculated by measuring the speed and calculate the pressure difference from the next relation p1 p2 = 1/2 p (v22- p v12 ) 4- Pitot tubes The pitot tube are one the most used in air flow measurement. The main idea for its operation is in measure the fluid velocity by converting the kinetic energy to potential energy. 5- Calorimetric flowmeter This device principle for fluid flow measurement is based on two temperature sensors in close contact with the fluid but thermal insulated from each other . one of the two sensors is contactly heated so there are temperature difference between the measurement of the two sensors . 5-turbine flowmeter 6-vortex flowmeter 7-electromagnetic flowmeter 8-ultrasonic Doppler flowmeter 9-positive displacement flowmeter 10-mass flowmeters 11-thermal flowmeter 12-open channel flowmeter Calorimetric operation theory The main idea for the operation theory of the calorimetric flowmeter based on measurements for the temperature before and after the nozzle by using two sensor and converting this difference to signal translated by the usage of the gauge indicators . When the fluid flow start passing into the nozzle the heat energy is drawn from the heated sensor and the temperature difference is directly proportional to the fluid flow rate through the nozzle Advantages and disadvantages of calorimetric flowmeter Advantages  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Disadvantages 1-high accuracy at minimum flow rate  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  1-costs 2- In general lower thermal conductivity require higher velocity for proper measurement.  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  2-appear cavitations in high speed 3-easy in its operation process  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  3-normally operates at low range 4-High repeatability  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  4-low noisy factor 5- high dynamic response  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  6-high sensitivity 7-small dimension ( portable ) Lab application Calorimetric provides two types of data. The first type is measurement of the heat capacities. This leads to values of the standard entropy St , the enthalpy ( or heat content ) HT- HS . And the enthalpies and the entropies of rapid phase changes (fusion, vaporization, polymorphism) of a single material. the second type of measurement of heats of chemical reaction ( formation from the elements or the oxides , relatively stability of competing phase assemblages , mixing in solid and liquids solutions ) either by direct reaction or through a thermchemical cycle such as is involved. Second application for the nozzle in the calorimeter is to spray the natural gas to burn it inside the combustion chamber. The next figure show example for burner nozzle. 1-Fuel properties and the effects of sprays Our fuel used in the calorimeter is the natural gas which takes the name of isooctane (C2H6) and it has the next microstructure Temperature The temperature difference between the inlet and the outlet of the nozzle also affecting on the nozzle performance this achieved by when the temperature increased this directly effecting on the fuel properties specially in its viscosity so in the petroleum applications for the high viscosity sometimes used heating process for the fuel before path through the nozzle . Surface Tension The Surface tension in natural is the tendency of the surface of the liquid to contracting with the smallest possible area. The effect is normally similar to the skin surrounding the body of the liquid and pulling it into the shape, which will have the least amount of the surface area. That shape is spherical shape. Surface tension Natural of flow The natural of fluid flow through the nozzle effect on its performance .for example in case of laminar flow the performance of the nozzle will be better than in case of turbulent flow. In case of found a head it also affect in the nozzle performance. Cleaning Nozzles In case of using fluids containing sluts and other dusts it concentrated in the main body of the nozzle which affect on the nozzle path that reduce the flow rate through the nozzle which affect on its performance . Spray Patterns The Nozzles used for oil burners are provided in two different general types of spray patterns, hollow cone and solid cone. These are illustrated in the below Figure. It will be noted in these illustrations that the hollow cone is a spray in which the concentration of droplets is at the outer edge of the spray with little or no fuel in the center of the spray versus the other type of sprays which leads to an weakness in the performance of the nozzle. Performance improvement The efficiency of the nozzle depending on several factors it concentrated on Type of sprayer and nozzle of design The percentage of air to fuel ratio Spark method from heaters to use the spark ignition technology. Percentage of carbon on the fuel So in the next section we discuss these factors which it can affect on the nozzle performance 1- Flammability ( burning start) The classical method for lighting the calorimeter is matching it is not efficient so that we improve the nozzle performance from this side by using the spark ignition technology. This spark ignition working depending on providing it with fixed voltage from battery to be able get the initial spark to start the burning process * The spark ignition which get the initial spark to the instrument get its power connected by wire (3mm ) which connected also to battery with 12 v . 2- Fuel to air ratio In the theory of the stoichiometric mixture has just enough air to completely burn burn the available fuel. In natural this is never quite achieved, due primarily to the very short time available in the internal combustion chamber for each combustion cycle. Most of this combustion process completes in approximately 4-5 milliseconds. This is the time that elapses from when the spark is fired until the burning process completed. The Air fuel ratio is the most common reference term used for mixtures in internal combustion engines It is the ratio between the mass of air and the mass of fuel in the fuel-air mix at any given moment For pure natural gas the stoichiometric mixture is approximately 14.7:1 or ? of 1.00 exactly 3-to make a window from the top to see the flame from inside instead of opening the system each time. We must use material Cleary to see out from it and work under pressure 10 bar {rm C_2H_6} + tfrac{7}{2}{rm O_2} rightarrow 2{rm CO_2} + 3{rm H_2O} Equivalent ratio The equivalence ratio of a system is defined as the ratio of the fuel-to-oxidizer ratio to the stoichiometric fuel-to-oxidizer ratio. Mathematically phi = frac{mbox{fuel-to-oxidizer ratio}}{(mbox{fuel-to-oxidizer ratio})_{st}} = frac{m_{fuel}/m_{ox}}{(m_{fuel}/m_{ox})_{st}} = frac{n_{fuel}/n_{ox}}{(n_{fuel}/n_{ox})_{st}} 4-carbon percentage in the fuel Natural gas is an extremely important source of energy for reducing pollution and maintaining a clean and healthy environment. In addition to being a domestically abundant and secure source of energy, the use of natural gas also offers a number of environmental benefits over other sources of energy, particularly other fossil fuels. This section will discuss the environmental effects of natural gas, in terms of emissions as well as the environmental impact of the natural gas industry itself. Scroll down, or click on the links below to be transported ahead. Conclusion The report is an investigation to describe the calorimeter process and the system operation with the nozzle performance and the method to improve its performance. So the main objectives from the report are To understand the basic principle of calorimeter and its necessity in engineering to investigate different types of calorimeters. The advantages and disadvantages using these calorimeters in the engineering lab environment. References 1- http://www.pro-techsolutionsltd.com/PDF/flownozzle.pdf 2- www.EngineeringToolBox.com 3- www.flowmeterdirectory.co.uk/flowmeter_calorimetric.html 4- www.webersensorsinc.com/glossary.html 5- S. Sosin, C. Moldovan, R. Iosub; Designing and manufacturing of a calorimetric micro-sensor for methane detection, CAS International Semiconductor Conference Proceedings, Vol. 2, 2004, pp. 381 384. 6- www.bioline.org.br/pdf?se08021 7-R. Mohan Kumar, R. Muraliddharan, D. Rajan Babu, K. V. Rajendiran, R. Jayavel, D. Jayaraman, and P.Ramasamy, J. Cryst. Growth 229, 568 (2001). 8-K. Meera, R. Muralidharan, R. Jeyavel, and P. Ramasamy, J. Cryst. Growth 263, 510 (2004).

An Inspector Calls :: English Literature

An Inspector Calls Essay There are many aspects that Priestley uses to make ‘An Inspector Calls’ successful on stage i.e. the use of dramatic irony, time zones, twists, cliff hangers and the 7 deadly sins. He also represents the inspector as omniscient and enigmatic and his surname is a homophone which is used symbolically. E.g. Goole to Ghoul. This makes him seem like ghostly spirit. J.B Priestley wrote this play as a message/moral to show the world that everyone is equal through terms of money and power. He saw more clearly the effects of both wars that some higher/upper class had no problems with rebuilding businesses, housing and even their lives as they had the money to do so. An element used to make ’An Inspector Calls’ successful on stage would be the ‘whodunnit’ genre. This differs from a detective genre as in a detective story there s a suspect that committed the crime but in ‘An Inspector Calls’ all of the characters in the same way helped to make Eva Smith/Daisy Renton commit suicide. Each member of the family had something to do with her whether it was physical contact or not; here is how each member was involved with her suicidal attack. Gerald and Eric both had sexual intercourse with Eva and Eric had left her pregnant, Sheila and Birling had no physical contact but both got her sacked from her job as a factory worker and working in a shop where Shelia shopped regularly, and last of all Mrs Birling pushed Eva to the limits when she would offer no help to Eva and her unborn foetus when she asked for help at the charity. Mrs Birling was the person who pushed Eva to the limit of committing suicide. The use of dramatic irony in ‘An Inspector Calls’ is used by most characters especially Mrs Birling who says to the inspector â€Å"I accept no blame for it at all†¦. Take some steps to find this young man and then make sure that he’s compelled to confess in public his responsibility†. The irony comes into this as she does not know that the father of the baby is Eric’s! Priestley presents all of the characters symbolising as the seven deadly sins. He presents the inspector as a mysterious, omniscient and enigmatic character : his name ‘Goole’, is a homophone for ‘Ghoul’ which we know is linked to the meaning ‘Ghost’; this makes you feel as if he is a kind of ghostly spirit; knowing some things before they happen. Priestley made Birling have mistaken predictions such as when Birling quoted, â€Å"‘the Titanic-she sails next week-absolutely unsinkable†, which makes the audience laugh with sarcasm as we all know that the

Self-Concepts in Julius Caesar :: Julius Caesar Essays

Self-Concepts in Julius Caesar All people have definite concepts of self. In different situations, one may feel short, tall, smart, slow, fast, talkative, reserved, etceteras. These self-concepts are usually very different than how others view us. Depending on one's actions, words or even tone of voice, one may misrepresent oneself and be misinterpreted. One may be so arrogant or so humble that they prevent themselves from seeing themselves through others' eyes. In William Shakespeare's play Julius Caesar, two main characters, Julius Caesar and Marcus Brutus, present different personas- one being each characters actual self-characterizations, which we learn through their discussions with others, and another is how they are actually perceived in the eyes of others. Their inability to project their true motives in performing certain actions eventually brings about their tragic downfalls. Julius Caesar believed that people needed one strong ruler in order to have maximum production and proper function of a society. He believed that he possessed many, if not all, of the characteristics required of a great leader. He spoke to others in a way which he believed exhibited authority, told people why he should be the one to lead them, and thought that his own advice was best. His unwillingness to listen to others is received as arrogance. Though already warned by the soothsayer to "beware the ides of March," Caesar refuses to heed advice to stay home from Calpurnia, his wife, because he feels that she is trying to keep him from obtaining power and status. Calpurnia believes Caesar to be a prince and is convinced that some falling meteors are warnings of a prince's death. When she hears her husband boast that he is more dangerous than danger itself, she recognizes that this is simple arrogance, and tells him so, saying, "Alas, my lord/ Your wisdom is consumed in confidence (Act II, scene 2)." In response to her criticism and humble petitions, Caesar momentarily agrees to pacify her. However, when he changes his mind and decides to leave against her admonitions, she reluctantly, but obediently fetches Caesar's robe and he departs for the Senate, and his meeting with fate. Caesar's greatest character flaw, however, is thinking that he is far above others and somehow invincible. When he compares his own perseverance with that of the North Star, saying "But I am as constant as

The Authors Character in A Good Man is Hard to Find by Flannery OConn

â€Å"A Good Man is Hard to Find† is a short story written by Flannery O’ Connor. O’Connor was an American writer whose writings always incorporated humor into a sad or devastating situation. Her collections include 31 short stories, two novels, and a couple of letters and speeches. O’Connor is most famous for her short story works. In numerous works of her, her conscious craftsmanship was revealed and also the devoted role that Roman Catholicism plays in her life (Flannery) O’ Connor was born the only child to her parents in Savannah, Georgia. Her father was a real estate agent and her mother was born into a very prominent family. When O’ Connor was twelve years old, her family moved back to her mothers hometown of Milledgeville, GA where her father was also the mayor of for a couple of years. Milledgeville was known as the ‘crazy’ town in Georgia. Milledgeville was home to one of the largest mental institutions in the United States. At the time this story was written, the hospital had 13,000 mentally ill patients hospitalized there. She was surrounded by crazy people. The influence of living in Milledgeville helped her in writing her stories. â€Å"A Good Man is Hard to Find† is one of O’Connor’s best and well known works. The work tells the story of a normal every day family and their trip to Florida. The trip begins as normal trips do, but then turns and there is an unexpected twist thrown in. The family encounters an escaped criminal who named himself The Misfit. The criminal and his accomplices threaten the family’s’ life, but while doing so are also very friendly and courteous. In a desperate attempt to save herself and her family, the grandmother begins talking to The Misfit telling him that she believes he really is a g... ... job with this story and I believe any reader can find some one or something in the story they can relate to and can apply the story to their every day life. The story has many lessons and morals that can be learned but adds a humorous twist to things. So I leave with this final though, in the words of Wendell Berry, â€Å"Practice Resurrection!† Works Citied â€Å"Flannery O’Connor† Tegasos Literature. 1 Feb 2006. O’Connor, Flannery. â€Å"A Good Man is Hard to Find† Discovering Literature. 3 Edition. Hans P. Guth and Gabrielle Rico, Eds. Uppersaddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall,2003:(355-365)† Woodiwis, Anna. â€Å"Jesus thrown everything off balance† Writings @ Swarthmore. 2003. WA Program at Swarthmore College. 1 Feb 2006.

Malayan Campaign – the Matador Plan

MALAYAN CAMPAIGN – THE MATADOR PLAN INTRODUCTION â€Å"Unfortunately, it has come to this, that either Japan must stop her expansion, or England must willingly give up some of what she has or hopes to have. Therein lies a cause for war. † Lt Cdr Tota Ishimaru, Imperial Japanese Navy 1. The fall of Malaya and Singapore to the hand of the Japanese is a tremendous sign that showed the failure of Operation Matador. In this battle study, there are chronology of events that will guide us very closely in knowing and understanding the reason why this operation failed to meet its objectives.In doing the research on the background of the battle of Malaya and the relativity to the Operation Matador, our syndicate members came across a reference to a plan of action for the defence of Singapore codenamed â€Å"Matador†. In fact there were two plans, so totally different, that in the end they contributed to the downfall of Singapore. Both had their weaknesses and one of the ma jor ones was the lack of co-ordination and command between the Army, Navy and Air Force. The other and more serious was a clash of ideals.The drawn-up plan was Land based Matador and Sea Based Matador. 2. From the research done, Operation Matador is not the sole reason for the fall of Malaya or even Singapore, besides there is some other reasons that had been identified as a contributing factor as well. This has been discussed in detail under the column of Battle Analysis. An examine on the lesson learned from this battle study would benefit the most as it focuses more on principles of war that will teaches us how, why, when and where it is applicable for an action plan taken at one time.AIM 3. This paper will examine two main part of the whole study on Matador Plan. The first part is to analyze the incidents that occur prior and upon the operation called The Matador Plan. Secondly, it is fundamentals to determine the lessons learnt and the effects on both forces. OBJECTIVE 4. The m ain objective of this battle study is to meet the requirement of the EOBC serial 28/2006 and secondly is to learn and adapt the knowledge of the war history generally on the Malayan Campaign and specifically the Matador Plan.In this way the young officers would be able to use battle study as a comparison between previous and present state of battle warfare in order to meet any circumstances and decision makings in the near future. SCOPE 5. Scope of discussions are as follow: a. Background. 1)Pre-war examination. 2)Forces involved. 3)The Attack. b. Matador Plan. 1)Land Based Matador 2)Sea Based Matador c. Chronology of events. d. Analysis on factors and effects. e. Tactical aspects applied. g. Lesson Learnt. h.Conclusion. BATTLE BACKGROUND PRE-WAR EXAMINATION 6. Before we look further into the Matador Plan, the fundamental or the main causes that inflict the war in Malaya should be given a consideration as it may be very useful in understanding the battle study. The battle in Malaya was a conflict between British Commonwealth forces, comprised of British, Indian, Australian and Malayan units, and the Imperial Japanese Army from December 8, 1941 until January 31, 1942 during the Second World War.Prior the attack by th Japanese forces, the British government's plans relied primarily on the stationing of a strong fleet at the Singapore Naval Base in the event of any enemy hostility, both to defend Britain's Far Eastern possessions and the route to Australia. At this time tension mounted in the region folowing the outbreak of the European war and the French in Indo-China clashed with the Thais. The Japanese make use of this as an oppurtunity with the increase on aggression over the region as well. 7.Upon the completion of the Singapore Naval Base and airfields on Singapore Island with other constructions on the Malayan Peninsula was underway, it was decided by the Air Ministry in London that was a right time to provide a fighter force for the area, even though few could be spared from the defence of Britain and her offensive in the Middle East. However, a threat to British and American possessions in the area was not considered to be imminent, as revealed in a letter from Prime Minister Churchill to US President Roosevelt, dated 15 February 1941: I do not myself think that the Japanese would likely to send the large military expedition necessary to lay seige to Singapore. The Japanese would no doubt occupy whatever strategic points and oilfields in the Dutch East Indies and thereabouts that they covet, and thus get a far better position for a full-scale attack on Singapore later on. They would also raid Australian and New Zealand ports and coasts, causing deep anxiety in those Dominions, which had already sent all their best trained fighting men to the Far East†. 8.In October 1940, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was appointed Commander-in-Chief Far East, and the G. H. Q. Far East opened at Singapore on the 18th November, 194 0. The Commander-in-Chief was responsible for the operational control and direction of training of British land and air forces in Malaya, Burma and Hong Kong, and for the co-ordination of plans for the defence of these territories. It also includes the control and training of British air forces in Ceylon and of reconnaissance squadrons in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal.His headquarters was an operational one, not administrative, and had no control over any naval forces. So Brook-Popham the man in charge on the spot had little control over the immediate military situation. Also just as important, he had no authority over the Civilian population in case of an impending war. This came under the direct control of Shenton–Thomas the Governor of Singapore, and to all intents and purposes he had absolute control. The only recourse Brook-Popham had to any control of the forces was directly to the Chiefs of Staff in London. FORCES INVOLVED 9.In November 1940, the army strength in Malaya was 17 battalions, with 1 mountain regiment of artillery. Reliance for the defence of the Far East was to be placed on air power until the fleet was available but it was the Governments policy to avoid war with Japan. The strength of the air forces in Malaya in November 1940, however, was only 88 first-line aircraft, of which only 48 could be counted as modern. The previous month, the Singapore Conference had recommended a strength of 582 aircraft for the Far East but it was admitted that this was an ideal, and far beyond the bounds of practical possibility.In May 1941, Lieutenant-General A. E. Percival had been appointed General Officer Commanding, Malaya Command, and with it a motley collection of 85 000 British, Australian, Indian and Malayan troops. 10. When in July 1941, the Japanese spread into southern Indo-China, the potential danger to Malaya and Burma increased, as the move gave them a naval base within 750 miles of Singapore and airfields only 300 miles from Kota B haru, the nearest point in Malaya. By the latter part of November, 1941, information accumulated which showed that an early Japanese attack was likely, despite the negotiations in progress in Washington.Both land and air reinforcements had been reaching Malaya, and by 7th December, the eve of the Japanese attack, there were 158 first-line aircraft available, with 88 in reserve; the land forces counted 31 infantry battalions, plus the equivalent of 10 volunteer battalions with some artillery, engineers, and a small armoured car unit, and 5 battalions of Indian States forces, with 7 field regiments 1 mountain regiment, 2 anti-tank regiments, 4 coast defence regiments and five anti-aircraft regiments of artillery and 10 field and 3 fortress companies of engineers – a total strength of close on 85,000 men.Almost one quarter of them were British, about one-sixth Australians, nearly one-half Indian Army, and the remainder local forces. 11. Even then, the R. A. F. Far East Command w as not in a position to fulfill its responsibility of being the primary means of resisting Japanese aggression, while the Army strength was far short of what was required to compensate for the deficiency in aircraft. There were only two-thirds the number of infantry required, no tanks and few armoured cars, and the lack of mobile anti-aircraft guns was serious.The Japanese Order of Battle remains unchanged throughout the course of the Champaign. The Japanese 25th Army consisted of 36,000 men plus air power, naval support and artillery support from the mainland, plus 100 tanks. Even though the Japanese soldiers were not as many compared the British forces they were significantly superior in close air support, armour, co-ordination, tactics and experience, with the Japanese units having fought in China.The Japanese had slightly fewer aircraft, their fighter aircraft were generally superior and achieved air superiority. THE ATTACK 12. Earlier the British had plans in place to forestall Japanese landings in Southern Thailand but Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East Command refused permission to launch Operation Matador and Operation Krohcol in advance of the Japanese attack, not wishing to run any risk of provoking the coming war. 13.Incredibly, as late as 29 September 1941, it was still believed by British military and civilian leaders in the Far East that Japan was committed to concentrating forces against the Soviet Union, and it was therefore improbable, so it was argued, that she would at the same time take on Britain, the United States and the Netherlands. By mid-November 1941 the official assessment was that war would not come until March 1942. The Japanese decided otherwise. Now the Japanese has really been on an invasion plan to attack the Malayan Peninsula and take over Singapore with a well planned tactics and operation. 4. On 7 December 1941, a British Hudson reconnaissance aircraft spotted Japanese naval vessels 100 miles/160 Km north-east of Singora with others steaming towards Patani. Despite this clear act of war by Japan, ‘Operation Matador' was not fully launched. Even so, the advance to The Ledge could, and should, have been immediately ordered. This was not done. As a result, an invaluable twenty four hours was lost during which time the Japanese forces landed and the British lost a most valuable opportunity.If they had held The Ledge, the invasion could have been delayed even though the landings could not have been prevented. 15. On the next day it was reported that Japanese troops were attempting to land at Kota Bharu and at the same time Singapore suffered its first air raid. War had come to Malaya. On 8 December the Japanese attacked the British air bases in Malaya with the devastating result that by the end of the day a mere 50 British aircraft were operational, the rest being destroyed. Those still operational were immediately ordered back to Singapore.Thus , on the first day of the attack Japan obtained total air supremacy over Nothern Malaya. The naval Force Z, consisting of the battleships HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, together with four destroyers, and commanded by Admiral Tom Phillips had arrived right before the outbreak of hostilities. Later the Japanese came to realised the presence of the battleships and its marching to the Northern Malaya. Two days later, on 10 December, the battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse, the only Royal Navy capital ships in the Far East, were sunk by Japanese torpedo-bombers off Kuantan. 16.The negative effect of the sinking of the Prince of Wales on British morale throughout the world was serious, with a concomitant boost to Japanese morale. By this single stroke Japan gained complete naval command of the South China and Java Seas and a large part of the Indian Ocean by leaving the east coast of Malaya exposed and allowing the Japanese to continue their landings. The drift to war by the Japanese met its objectives by the invasion of the Malayan Peninsula subsequently the Singapore Island. MATADOR PLAN 17. What is Matador Plan? What is the relativity of the drawn up plan is all about to this study?Matador Plan is a plan of action for the defence of Singapore. The two plans were totally different, that in the end they contributed to the downfall of Singapore. Both had their weaknesses. One of the major ones was the lack of co-ordination and command between the Army, Navy and Air Force. The other and more serious is the clash of ideals. The first one a Naval plan by Churchill, the other a Land based plan by Brook-Popham. Now I will outline both plans for a thorough understanding. The Land Based Matador 18. History of Malaya War shows that Brook-Popham was the man on the spot who could evaluate a more accurate assessment of the needs.His plan was a land based Matador. This was a plan of action that envisaged an attack by the Japanese from the North of Ma laya via Thailand and the Kara Isthmus. It was drawn up by Brook-Popham, in August 1941 and he submitted his plan to London for approval. It is believed that if the plan was implemented at the right time, it possibly could have delayed the Japanese long enough to allow the British forces stationed in Malaya and Singapore to mount a delaying action until reinforcements arrived. 19. Land Based Matador relied on assumption that the Japanese would land on the east coast of Thailand at two points that of Songkhla and Pattani.The next would be advancing south to Jitra and lower down to Kroh. It was envisaged in Matador that two forces could intercept them just over the boarder in Thailand, thus allowing long enough for the main force to assemble and attack. There was only one problem, if the British were to implement this without the Japanese being at war with Thailand first, it would be seen as an attack by the British on a neutral country. To complicate matters further Sir Josiah Cosby the British Ambassador in Siam the previous year 1940 had signed a non-aggression pact with Pibul the President of Thailand.Requests by Brook-Popham to London for additional resources to cover this Plan were made around January 1941, but remained unfulfilled. This plan was considered a good plan and consequently it also had its problem due to unavoidable consequences. The main obstacle was one of them being Churchill. It is known that  Churchill had distrust of it lay in the political aspects and at the same time he also favoured being a naval man with a naval solution wherein the plan was mainly a Land Based Matador. The Sea Based Matador 20.The Sea Based Matador referred on the need of resources especially the battle ships to defend the Singapore Island. In Duff Coopers report of the Defence of Singapore in 1939 it was stated that no less than 8 war ships would be needed to defend Fortress Singapore. Churchill was not in the business of land forces at the time, he was First Lord of the Admiralty  as such was fighting for his part in any forthcoming action. Churchill had been told of the situation of what he later proclaimed in Parliament as, â€Å"Fortress Singapore† and its armaments.He proclaimed that â€Å"It had several big guns and there were a lot of troops on a island that he had never seen, but not enough in the way of Navy†. 21. At Duff Coopers conference of the 29th September 1941 in Singapore, it was stated that at the least Two Battleships would be needed as a minimum. Those attended the meeting were Sir Robert Brook-Popham, Sir Earl Page, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, Sir Shenton Thomas, Governor of Singapore and Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton. Once Churchill became the Prime Minister he held the final decision. But what Churchill sent and eventually happened, was a cobbled result. The Prince of Wales' and ‘Repulse' that turned up with escorts called â€Å"Force Z†. It was a disaster for the British upon the sinking of the two main battle ships. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 22. The chronology of events that involved along the path of Matador Plan implementation are as follows. a. In year 1937. Major-General William Dobbie Officer Commanding Malaya (1935 – 1939), looked at Malaya's defences, he reported that during the monsoon season from October to March landings could be made by an enemy on the east coast and bases could be established in Siam.He predicted that landings could be made at Songkhla and Pattani in Siam, Thailand and Kota Bharu in Malaya. He recommended large reinforcements to be sent immediately. His predictions turned out to be correct but his recommendations were ignored. b. In January 1941. A request for additional resources remained unfulfilled which the plan intended to use and the previous year in 1940 Sir Josiah Cosby the British Ambassador in Siam, had signed a non-aggression pact with Prime Minister Pibul of Siam. c. In August 1941.The Commander-in-Chief (Cin C) of British Far East Command Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham submitted a plan code named Matador to London for approval. The plan relied on assumption that the Japanese would land on the east coast of Siam at Songkhla and Pattani, then advancing south to Jitra and lower down to Kroh. It was envisaged that two forces could intercept them just over the border in Thailand, long enough for the main force to assemble and attack. d. On November 29, 1941. Air Headquarters at Singapore is warned to be ready to support Operation Matador at 12 hours notice. e. On November 30, 1941.The Commanding Officer of the Japanese 25th Division, Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita, receives orders to proceed with the invasion of Singapore. At the same time 21 Squadron RAAF is based at Sungei Patani. f. On December 2, 1941. HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse arrive at Singapore Harbour escorted by a number of ships including HMAS Vampire. g. On December 4, 1941. The Japanese fleet leaves Samah Harbour at d awn. h. On December 5, 1941. When the threat of Japanese invasion became more likely, the plan was modified to use the forces available, it was to be put into action as soon as an attack was imminent.The plan was that if an enemy attacked, or were invited into, Siam, troops under British command would rush to Songkhla and defend it against a sea borne attack. This job was allocated to Major-General Murray-Lyon's Indian 11th Infantry Division who also had to defend Jitra, this over stretched his resources and made it a difficult task to do. i. On December 5, 1941. London gave permission for Cin C Far East Command to decide if Operation Matador should be activated. The chief strategic decision to be decided was whether Siam should be invaded in a pre-emptive move before the Japanese landings took place.Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was ordered to launch Operation Matador. The Malaya Command was responsible for the detailed planning of Operation Matador. j. On December 6, 1941. It had rewor ked the plan and allocated forces for immediate deployment. Which is what General Officer Commanding Malaya Arthur Percival recommended that evening in meeting with the Governor Sir Shenton Thomas and Cin C Brooke-Popham decided it is premature to launch the operation which included the pre-emptive move into Siam. With hind sight this was the wrong decision. 23.However, if Matador had been implemented the Japanese had a counter worked out. They would use the Bangkok airport and the airfields of Southern Siam to enable air cover to be established, and then invade from the Kra Isthmus. TACTICAL ASPECTS APPLIED 24. There were a lot of differences between British prediction and actual location of the Japanese landings in Malaya Peninsula. For detail, refer to figure 1 and figure 2 in appendix. The ‘Red' dot on the map is where the last sighting of the approaching Japanese armada was on the 6th December at approx 12. 30am by British RAF spotter planes.And the ‘Orange' dot on the map the â€Å"presumed British† and â€Å"actual Japanese† meeting place of the Japanese fleet on the 7th December 1941. The real Japanese meeting place was just 200 miles from Songkhla, Pattani and Kota Bharu, the assumed meeting place by Brook-Popham was some 400 miles, double the distance and of course double the time. In the event the Japanese landed at, Prachoup 1 craft, Chumphon 2 craft, Bandon 2 craft, Nakhon 3 craft, Songkla and Pattani 18 craft and  Kota Bharu 3 craft. 25. The Japanese had forestalled the effect of Matador by having a secondary plan.In the event if Matador was implemented, the Japanese were under the orders to occupy the airfield of Bangkok and the airfields of Southern Thailand to enable air cover to be established, thus paving the way for the invasion from the Kara Isthmus and the inevitable fall of Singapore. It shows the invader is truly tactical enough to apply the secondary plan if the primary met with failure. It was the combinati on of confused action and wildly differing approaches to what was perceived as the enemies’ tactics that eventually lead to the fiasco of Malaya and Fortress Singapore.Beside, the Japanese also use ‘blitzkrieg’ tactics that was used by the Germans during Europe Campaign. BATTLE ANALYSIS ANALYSIS ON FACTORS AND EFFECTS 26. The Matador plan can be analyzed from several factors which concluded to its failure. The factors identified are as follows: a. Lack of Resources. The Matador plan relied on assumption that the Japanese would land on the east coast of Siam at Songkhla and Pattani, then advancing south to Jitra and lower down to Kroh.British forces could intercept them just over the border in Thailand, long enough for the main force to assemble and attack. But the plan was modified to use the forces available and it was to be put into action as soon as an attack was imminent. If an enemy attacked, or were invited into Siam, troops under British command would rush to Songkhla and defend it against a sea borne attack. This job was allocated to Major-General Murray-Lyon's of Indian 11th Infantry Division who also had to defend Jitra, this has over stretched his resources and made it a difficult task to do.Beside, in the absence of the main fleets, RAF was fully responsible to carry out its task effectively in defence, it was estimated that it required a minimum of 336 modern aircraft including a long range striking force. At the outbreak of hostilities it had a mere 158, most of which were obsolescent. The lack of resources and the assign of multiple tasks at one time by the British made them facing more difficulties in defending its position against the Japanese. b. Non-strategic defence position.The decision to defend the Singapore base by holding the whole of Malaya meant that in the absence of the fleet the task fell primarily on the RAF. Because of the key role allotted to the air force it was decided that the primary task of the army was to defend the airfields from which the RAF operated. These airfields had been built without reference to the military but rather to suit civilian requirements. From a military viewpoint they were located too close to the coast and too close to the border of Siam to be effectively defended. c. Time Window.Matador was approved late for the plan to succeed. For Operation Matador to succeed, time was of the absolute essence. British forces had to be in Singora before the Japanese landed. However, as Britain attempted to the very end to avoid war with Japan, the military were forbidden to violate Siamese territory until an actual outbreak of war. With such a constraint, and time being of the essence, Operation Matador should have been abandoned. d. Command and Control. Earlier on December 5, 1941, London gave permission for Cin C the Far East Command to decide if Operation Matador should be activated.The strategic decision to be decided was whether Siam should be invaded in a pre-emptiv e move before the Japanese landings took place. The Malaya Command was responsible for the detailed planning of Operation Matador and on December 6, 1941 it had reworked the plan and allocated forces for immediate deployment. General Officer Commanding Malaya Arthur Percival recommended in meeting with the Governor of Singapore Sir Shenton Thomas and Cin C Brooke-Popham decided it is premature to launch the operation which included the pre-emptive move into Siam. e. Political Aspects.British do not want to be the first nation to trespass the non alliance of Thailand in the war and will not approved matador planned until there is solid evidence that shows that the Japanese is up to move to Thailand territory. To forestall the anticipated Japanese invasion the British High Command evolved a plan to seize the Siamese port of Singora which is ‘Operation Matador' and to delay the anticipated Japanese advance from Patani by holding a position called ‘The Ledge'. This plan requ ired crossing the international frontier into Siam thus making Britain guilty of violating official Siamese neutrality.In the year 1940 Sir Josiah Cosby the British Ambassador in Siam, had signed a non-aggression pact with Prime Minister Pibul of Siam. f. Lack of Importance. Under the command of Jen AE Percival, there were some 85000 British, Australian, Indian and Malayan troops. However some of the problems associated with this force included poor quality officers, poor training, especially in jungle warfare, lack of civilian labour to construct defences and lack of homogeny. g. The Blame. The blame of Matador Plan failure cannot only be pointed to General Percival because the launch of the plan must be approved from Churchill in London.He must have disliked it so much and there weren’t any reference to it in Churchill's memoirs as well. He seems to have conveniently forgotten all about it. Churchill’s distrust of it lay in the political aspects, he also favoured bei ng First Lord of the Admiralty   a naval man, a naval solution thus the sea based matador were developed. h. Operation Theatre Priorities. The Matador Plan was stalled repeatedly by Churchill, who wanted the scarce resources of aeroplanes, troops and other equipment diverted to his other priority areas, such as the Middle East and Russia.Britain's defence, the Middle East and the Soviet Union had all received higher priorities in the allocation of men and material, so the desired air force strength of 300 to 500 aircraft was never reached whereas the Japanese invaded with over two hundred tanks, the British Army in Malaya did not have a single one. i. The Wrong Assessment. Other than that, the war in the Middle East, the world's oil pipeline and gateway to India, was not going well. At the same time, Russian vulnerability added to the complexities of the situation.In 1941, Churchill delivered 440 aircraft to Russia. He also diverted an entire division, which was bound for Singapor e, the 7th Australian Division, to the Middle East and one brigade of the 9th Indian Division to Iraq. Churchill estimate, Japan will not enter the war unless the Germans had invaded Britain successfully. j. Lack of Intelligence. British intelligence had failed in providing the real assessment of Japanese assault lan on Malaya. As a result the British had failed to provide an adequate force and resources to meet the Japanese thrust.LESSON LEARNT 27. In the final analysis, it was a British failure to adhere to the principles of war in the implementation of the Matador Plan and the Japanese vision and motivation that led to the defeat of the British in the Malayan Campaign. a. Selection and The Maintenance Of The Aim. British has made the wrong decision making on the aspects of strategic defence plan of Malaya rather than knowing and understanding the Japanese strategic plan to conquer Malaya and Singapore. Japanese intentions are as follows: )Japan maybe to conquer Singora and Patani as habour to seize the important air field at Kedah and then move to North West of Malaya. 2)Landed at Kota Bharu to take over the air field. 3)Landed at Kuantan and move to west over the Kuantan-Raub road or Mersing road for Singapore assault through North of Malaya. Percival was unaware of these intentions and put the little sources to defence the other different area. On the other hand, the British thought that Japan will assault Malaya through Singapore. b. Maintenance Of Morale. The Japan inner strength was very high.All the Japan soldiers had their ideology which is â€Å"east for east† where in their psychology they had to rise with the morale in order to face war difficulties. Japan had all the factors that guaranteed the success with having good war equipment, efficiency and encouragement. c. Concentration of Force. The British didn’t forestalled a large number of forces at the planned or strategic location in order to resist any Japanese landing from the Nor th wherein this was an advantages to the Japanese forces. d. Economy of Effort. The highest Japan Royal Company gave 100 days to conquer Malaya and Singapore.Thinking about the mission, Jen Yamashita gave their order to throw the unnecessary equipment from their soldier and planning to remain a smooth movement from combination of expensive British roads and cheap Japan bicycle. He ordered his soldier that didn’t have any vehicle to ride bicycle. This is not just gave the smooth movement but also reduce man power from jungle tracking and walk. e. Surprise. Japan has attack Malayan from North where the British defence was very weak at the enemy aimed position. They attack Malaya in raining season when British not expected the Japan will attack on that time.That situation was entirely a surprise and a piece of well planned action. f. Offensive Action. Japan launched amphibious assault in north beach Malaya at Kota Bahru to move down into East beach of Malaya. This movement is do ne by landed at Patani and Singora in Thailand, whereas they move to South through road land to cross Malayan-Thailand borders to attack from west of Malaya. g. Cooperation. Cooperation can be analysed by comparing the both forces and there are: 1)Original defence planning on Malaya and Singapore depend on two factors, and it was British Far East Armada and American Pacific Armada.Far East Armada was supposed to have 1 carrier, 7 battleship, 11 cruiser and 24 destroyer was not to send because the strategic situation at Europe and Mediterranean and the effect from France failure. The British had no option rather than to deliver 2 battleships that are Repulse and Prince of Wales, while America Pacific Armada was destroyed at Pearl Habour. It was a fail of cooperation that British had no choices to support while Japan easily landed at Malaya. 2)While the Japanese had successfully integrated their entire asset including land, sea and air in giving the maximum fire power and maneuver.The cooperation between 3rd div (Air) Commander, Southern Sqn (Sea) Commander with all (Land) Army Chief’s a success to destroyed the British defence position. 25th Army Commander Lt Jen Yamashita had given his authority to coordinate the sea and air asset in order to achieve ‘mui’ in conquering Malaya and Singapore. h. Security. Beach defence built at Malaya in order to face the Japanese landings, including concertina wire, under water obstacles and machine gun placement were not good enough to give a supreme security and protection for the British.The implication from this, the British suffered a lot of casualties. Japanese also suffered a lot of casualties and this has shown that the British weakness in order to make sure the safety of their soldier itself. i. Flexilibity. To launch the Matador Plan Percival needed permission from British government in London. British government refused to launch this plan until they have proofs that the Japanese has landed in Th ailand. That situation shows that matador plan does not have the flexibility for an execution purposes. CONCLUSION 28.The Matador plan can be analyzed from several factors which conclude to its failure. The factor involves all aspects from the column of battle analysis. Matador was approved late for the plan to succeed. For Operation Matador to succeed, time was of the absolute essence. The delays in mobilization meant that the troops did not receive the order to launch ‘Operation Matador' effect, and morale suffered. An attempt by British troops to advance to The Ledge fell six miles 9. 6 km short of its objective when on 10 December 1941 Japanese troops overran the leading battalions.Another disaster, and with it any real chance for British troops to delay the Japanese advance until relief came, occurred on 12 December 1941 when the strategically-located and well-prepared Jitra position was abandoned within twenty four hours of being attacked. 29. The intention of the Britis h had been to hold it for approximately three months. Thus, after the twenty years of preparation to avoid such an eventuality, the fate of Malaya, and with it Singapore, was sealed in the first four days of the campaign.In the words of Major General Woodburn Kirby, ‘One can sum up by saying that those responsible for the conduct of the land campaign in Malaya committed every conceivable blunder. They underrated the enemy, paid insufficient attention to the training of their troops and delayed taking urgent decisions even after the Japanese had landed on Malayan soil. Singapore and the naval base were lost between 8 and 12 December'. Prime Minister of Britain, Churchill and all his decision made during the Malayan Campaign was also considered as a worst decision making in the war campaign ever in the history.Appendix 1 [pic] Figure 1: This shows what Brook-Popham had assumed happened from the intelligence he had received. [pic] Figure 2: This is what actually happened from the records of the Japanese BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Cull Brian, Buffaloes Over Singapore, Grub Street, London 2003. 2. Lt Gen AE Percival, The War in Malaya. 3. Sir John Smyth V. C, Percival and The Tragedy of Singapore, 1987. 4. Wikipedia, Battle of Malaya, HTML. 5. Chye Kooi Loong, The British Battalion In The Malayan Campaign 1941-1942, 2002. [pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic]